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Abstract
In public debates over multiculturalism in Europe, Islamic values and ways of life 
are commonly represented as incompatible with Western rights and liberties. 
Against this background, Muslim minorities have developed generally strong 
and stable religious identities. This paper asks when and how multicultural 
cities and ethnic communities give rise to strong and stable religion. Taking 
an approach from religious boundary making as a heuristic framework, we 
bring together a series of five studies on the religious identities of Muslim 
minorities. The studies compare religious group boundaries and replicate 
boundary making processes (cf. Wimmer, 2008) across ethnic communities 
and multicultural cities as comparative cases. Drawing on several large-scale 
surveys of Muslim minorities, our comparative findings illuminate the making 
and unmaking of religious boundaries. We conclude that strong religion is 
‘made in Europe’ as institutional rigidities and social inequalities enforce 
religious boundary making through social closure and cultural maintenance 
within ethnic communities.
Keywords:  boundary making, religion, Islam, Europe, second generation, cultural 
maintenance
1. Introduction
The unprecedented scale of continuing immigration from majority Muslim 
sending countries into the North-West of Europe has transformed the 
religious landscape of the historically Christian and highly secularised 
European cities. Majority attitudes towards this new religious diversity have 
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the aftermath of September 11th (Pew Forum, 2011). In public debates over 
immigrant integration and multiculturalism, Islamic faith traditions and 
ways of life are often represented as incompatible with Western cultural 
values, rights and liberties (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). In the eyes of 
the majority, the religiosity of Muslim minorities is a barrier which stands 
in the way of their societal integration (Foner & Alba, 2008). From the 
perspective of Muslim minorities, in contrast, their religious identity is a 
highly valued source of cultural continuity and social support (Ysseldyk, 
Matheson & Anisman, 2010). Against this background, Muslim minorities 
in Europe have generally developed strong religious identities, which have 
been efffectively transmitted to the next generation (Voas & Fleischmann, 
2012). In the Netherlands, for instance, the second generation of Turkish 
and Moroccan Muslims report high levels of dietary practice and prayer; 
and their mosque attendance is on the rise with attendance rates approach-
ing those of the fĳ irst generation (Maliepaard, Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2012; 
Maliepaard & Gijsberts 2012). From the perspective of Muslim youth, their 
religion is a central part of their minority identity and a source of collective 
self-worth in the face of public hostility (Martinovic & Verkuyten 2012; 
Ysseldyk, Matheson & Anisman, 2010).
Looking beyond these well-established facts, the present paper asks 
the question when and how religious boundary making processes give rise 
to strong and stable religious identities. Using boundary making processes 
as a heuristic framework, we compare multicultural cities and ethnic com-
munities as the proximal integration contexts that set the stage for strong 
religious identities. Specifĳ ically, the paper integrates fĳ ive separate stud-
ies among Turkish and Moroccan Muslim minority groups in Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden.
A rich qualitative research literature documents how religion shapes the 
identity construals of Muslim minority youngsters in particular countries 
(e.g., De Koning, 2008 in the Netherlands; Dassetto, 1996 in Belgium; Khos-
rokhavar, 1997 in France; Raj, 2000; Werbner, 2000 in Britain; Schifffauer, 2000 
in Germany; Schmidt, 2011 in Denmark; Eid, 2007 in Canada). Looking across 
countries, however, comparative case studies of religious diversity have 
mostly privileged top-down perspectives from national institutions and 
policy regimes (cf. Bader, 2007). Though there have been some recent quan-
titative cross-nationally comparative studies of religion which have focused 
on the micro-level (e.g. Connor, 2010; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir, 2011; 
Connor and Koenig, 2013), these have largely neglected the European-born 
Muslims. Our research supplements the above literatures with quantitative 
comparative strategies. The fĳ ive studies in this paper exploit micro-level 
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comparative data on the religious identities of Muslim minorities from 
several large-scale surveys in the Netherlands and across European cities in 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Sweden. It should be acknowledged 
that the advantage of comparative scope is offfset by inherent restrictions in 
quantitative measures of religion. These measures cannot fully capture the 
multiple meanings and situated performances of ‘thick’ religious identities. 
Yet, our analyses improve on earlier quantitative research by including 
multiple indicators of religious identifĳ ication and behavioural practices 
among self-identifĳ ied Muslims. Moreover, our studies validate religious 
constructs across gender, ethnic groups, and cities by way of multi-group 
measurement models; and comparisons of religious identity are controlled 
for generally low levels of (parental) education or socio-economic status of 
Muslim minorities in Europe (Heath, Rothon & Kilpi, 2008).
We start by introducing our theoretical framework on religious boundary 
making. In a second part of the paper, we address our fĳ irst research question 
when religious boundaries are more salient, by comparing religious identi-
ties of Muslim minorities across cities in studies 1 and 2. In a fĳ inal third part 
of the paper, to answer the how question, we focus on the micro-processes 
of social closure and cultural maintenance within ethnic communities 
(Studies 3, 4 and 5).
2. Religious boundary making: a heuristic framework
Our comparative strategies and fĳ indings are theoretically informed by 
an integrative approach from religious group boundaries. The boundary 
framework originates in Barth’s (1969) classic ‘Ethnic groups and bounda-
ries: The social organisation of cultural diffference’, where he pioneered 
a constructivist approach of ethnicity as a social process rather than a 
cultural given. Looking beyond ethnicity proper, Lamont and Molnár (2002) 
defĳine boundaries as evaluative distinctions between groups, such as social 
classes or races, which are anchored in societal institutions and enacted 
in daily practices and interactions. The framework was introduced into 
comparative migration studies by (among others) Bauböck (1998), Lamont 
(2000) and Alba (2005). Applying a historical-institutional approach of group 
boundaries to religion, for instance, Alba (2005) argued that religion in 
Germany and France marks a bright boundary separating (mainly Muslim) 
immigrants from the mainstream, much like race in the United States. For 
our purposes, we will draw on Wimmer’s (2008) multi-level process model 
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as micro-social processes with macro-level institutionalist approaches. Our 
main interest is in contextualising religion and not in testing a comprehen-
sive model, so we focus on the crux of the model as it applies to religious 
boundary making, and emphasise particularly the minority perspective. 
More precisely, our comparative data and designs loosely correspond to 
Wimmer’s conceptualisation of interlocking macro-constraints and micro-
processes of boundary making. Figure 1 gives an overview of our heuristic 
framework and how the fĳ ive studies are located within this framework.
Figure 1  Religious Boundary Making: Heuristic Framework and Studies
In a nutshell, diffferent institutional orders and power hierarchies in society 
constitute varying macro-level constraints on group boundaries. As applied 
to religious boundaries, in the absence of accommodation (institutional 
orders) and with increasing degrees of inequality (power hierarchies) along 
religious lines, more salient religious boundaries will defĳine strong religious 
identities (see Figure 1). Salience refers to the degree of ‘groupness’ associated 
with a particular boundary (Wimmer, 2008). When religious boundaries 
are more salient, for instance, being a member of a religious group is more 
consequential, not only for religious involvement but also for one’s social 
life. Thus, reasoning from institutional constraints, religious boundaries 
should be more salient in cities where Islam as a minority religion is less 
accommodated institutionally. Likewise, power hierarchies difffer between 
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cities, with more inequality and hence more salient boundaries in cities 
where religious minority status coincides with socio-economic disadvan-
tage. In those cities, the religious identifĳ ication of the second generation 
will have more pervasive implications for religious practice and for their 
societal integration. Conversely, there should be more leeway for selective 
and ultimately private or ‘symbolic’ forms of religion (cf. Gans, 1994) in more 
inclusive city contexts. Moreover, in the latter cities, religious identifĳ ication 
would not impede the societal integration of the second generation. To 
address our fĳ irst question when religious boundaries are more salient, the 
fĳ irst part of this paper compares the religious identities of Muslim minori-
ties across cities with varying degrees of institutional accommodation and 
ethnic inequality (Studies 1 and 2).
Our comparative design focuses on cities, rather than countries, because 
multicultural cities constitute the proximal context of integration for im-
migrants and their children. Thus, we do not assume that processes of 
religious boundary making are unfolding mainly at the national level, but 
rather focus on multicultural cities as comparative cases because they 
represent strategic research sites where local, national and transnational 
forces intersect. As centres of public debate and political decision making, 
they are most proximal places where national institutions are designed, 
represented and contested.
In this paper, we reason that institutional arrangements may not coincide 
with grand national philosophies of integration; yet they have developed 
in a path-dependent way from existing institutions which are reinvented 
to accommodate (or not) new forms of diversity. While liberal-democratic 
states do not – and should not – shape the religious life of their citizens in 
a deterministic fashion, institutional regulations nevertheless impose real 
constraints on the development of religious organisations and institutions 
by immigrant communities (Koenig, 2007, Bader, 2007, Fetzer and Soper, 
2005). From a comparative perspective, therefore, we expect a long-term 
impact of distinct institutional patterns on patterns of integration and 
religiosity in the next generation, over and above variation as a function of 
local specifĳ icities and more short-term changes in public sentiments and 
policy responses.
Comparisons across multicultural cities take a top-down approach of 
religious boundaries from the institutions and structures that are in place 
and that affford strong religion. But they leave unanswered the question 
how boundaries are made salient. To answer the how question, the second 
part of this paper focuses on the micro-processes of social closure and 
cultural maintenance within ethnic communities (Studies 3, 4 and 5). 
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In his multi-level model of boundary making, Wimmer proposed social 
closure and cultural maintenance as key processes connecting macro-level 
constraints to the making (and unmaking) of group boundaries. Applying 
these notions to religious boundaries, we argue that religious boundary 
making is enforced from the bottom up through binding social ties (social 
closure) and shared cultural preferences (cultural maintenance) among 
fellow Muslims (see Figure 1).
3. Comparing religious boundaries across multicultural 
cities
Taking an approach from religious boundary making as a heuristic frame-
work, this paper sets out to illuminate when and how multicultural cities 
and ethnic communities give rise to strong religious identities. We will now 
address the when question.
To empirically ground our comparative approach, we will discuss 
the main fĳ indings from two cross-national studies of the Turkish second 
generation in up to seven cities in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2012; Phalet, Fleischmann & Stojčić, 2012). 
The cities in these four countries were selected because they represent 
diffferent national histories of church-state relations, which have been 
extended to incorporate the new religious diversity (Fetzer & Soper, 2005). 
Moreover, the cities difffer in the placement of Muslim minorities in local 
power hierarchies.
Our main aim is to examine the diffferential salience of religious group 
boundaries in diffferent cities. Study 1 compares the diffferent confĳigurations 
of religious identity and various religious practices across multicultural 
cities (Phalet, Fleischmann & Stojčić, 2012). Study 2 focuses on the coupling 
or uncoupling of religious identity and social integration in mainstream 
society (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2012). Before discussing the fĳ indings of 
studies 1 and 2, we start by discussing diffferences between national and 
local contexts in terms of institutional orders and power hierarchies.
3.1. Institutional orders 
European cities represent institutional orders which difffer in the degree of 
accommodation of religious diversity and Islam in particular (see Figure 1). 
City diffferences are tied up – though not synonymous – with national 
philosophies of integration, with countries like Sweden, Great Britain, and 
(until recently) the Netherlands granting some degree of multicultural 
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recognition of minority cultures, whereas countries like Germany, France or 
Switzerland put more emphasis on cultural assimilation. In particular, the 
accommodation of Islam as a minority religion has followed from histori-
cally established patterns of church-state relations in each country (Fetzer 
& Soper, 2005). As we will describe below, distinct institutional pathways 
come with varying degrees of religious accommodation: they may grant 
or withhold formal recognition of Islam; and they may facilitate or restrict 
the establishment of Islamic organisations (Statham et al., 2005). In spite 
of an abundant literature on cross-national diffferences in the recognition 
and accommodation of minority religious traditions across Europe (cf. 
Maussen, 2007 for a review), there is relatively little empirical research into 
the consequences of diffferent degrees of institutional accommodation for 
the ways in which Muslim minorities are defĳ ining and performing their 
religious identities (Voas & Fleischmann, 2012).
From an institutional perspective then, the accommodation of Islam has 
been least complete in Germany, more complete in Belgium and Sweden, 
and most complete in the Netherlands (Fleischmann & Phalet 2012). In 
Germany, Islamic organisations remain disadvantaged relative to estab-
lished churches both legally and fĳ inancially. Due to their formal status as 
corporations of public law, Christian churches profĳit from taxes collected 
by the German state. Lacking a centralised organisational structure similar 
to that of the Christian churches, German Muslims have been denied the 
same legal status by the German authorities (Fetzer and Soper, 2005).
In Belgium, the status of Islam is formally equal to that of the historically 
dominant Catholic Church. Yet, in order to receive the state funding for 
religious services to which they are legally entitled, Muslim communities 
were required to set up a nationally representative Islamic council as a 
partner for the Belgian state (Foblets and Overbeeke, 2002). Such a council 
has been established only recently upon the initiative of the Belgian authori-
ties. Because of the delayed implementation of the recognition of Islam, 
Islamic organisational structures are less fully developed in Belgium than 
they are in e.g. the Netherlands.
In Sweden Islam enjoys the same legal status as other religions; and 
Islamic organisations are entitled to state funding proportionally to the 
size of their membership. However, Sweden has historically known a state 
church, which still counts more than 80 per cent of the Swedish popula-
tion as its members (Alwall, 2000). Although the privileged position of the 
Swedish Lutheran Church has been dismantled in the second half of the 
twentieth century, the legacy of the state church system implies that Islam 
occupies a relatively marginal position.
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Due to the Dutch history of ‘pillarisation’ (Lijphart, 1968) and despite 
increasing secularisation among the majority population, pluralist church-
state relations created opportunities for Muslims to develop their own 
institutions (Rath et al., 1996). Thus, Dutch Muslims have established 
numerous local mosque associations, as well as state-funded Islamic 
broadcasting networks and Islamic schools (Doomernik, 1995). From an 
institutional perspective then, Dutch Muslims were granted formal equality 
with Christian and other religious groups from the early 1980s onwards; 
and they made the most of the opportunities offfered by the Dutch system.
3.2. Power hierarchies 
Looking beyond formal institutions, Wimmer (2008) defĳ ines power hi-
erarchies in terms of degrees of inequality between groups in society. As 
comparative indicators of inequality, we rely on educational attainment, as 
well as the degree of residential segregation of Muslims. Power hierarchies 
derive from – and perpetuate – objective group diffferences in access to 
resources. Whereas lower educational qualifĳ ications ref lect restricted 
resources in immigrant families, higher qualifĳ ications are a prerequisite for 
the second generation to gain access to stable and well-paid jobs. Moreover, 
at higher levels of ethnic segregation in neighbourhoods and schools, the 
second generation has less access to the mainstream cultural and social 
resources that are typically valued in school and in the labour market. Our 
study compares across cities in four countries that difffer in their placement 
of Muslim minorities towards the bottom end of relatively enduring power 
hierarchies.
The German cities represent the most exclusionary end with very 
high degrees of educational inequality and residential segregation (Crul, 
Schneider & Lelie, 2012). In contrast, Stockholm clearly represents the more 
inclusive end, with relatively low degrees of inequality and segregation, 
and with signifĳ icant numbers of the second generation enrolled in higher 
education and present in majority neighbourhoods. Finally, Dutch and 
Belgian multicultural cities fall in between these two ends, with small 
portions of the second generation entering higher education and mov-
ing into majority neighbourhoods. Importantly, city-level comparisons 
allow further distinctions within countries between the capital cities of 
Berlin, Amsterdam and Brussels and the cities of Frankfurt, Rotterdam and 
Antwerp respectively. Especially the industrial economies of Rotterdam 
and Antwerp represent more uneven integration contexts for the second 
generation than Amsterdam and Brussels due to their more polarised labour 
market as well the more restrictive public opinion climate due to the greater 
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success of right-wing political movements in the harbour cities. From a 
boundary approach, we reason that religious practice will be most strict 
(Study 1) and religious identity least compatible with societal integration 
(Study 2) in cities where Islam is less accommodated institutionally and 
where Muslim minorities are more socially disadvantaged.
3.3. Private, selective and strict religious identities 
In Study 1, Phalet, Fleischmann and Stojčić (2012) examined the salience 
of religious group boundaries among the Turkish second generation. We 
operationalised the diffferential salience of religious boundaries between 
the cities in terms of the coupling (or uncoupling) of religious identity 
with behavioural involvement in religious practices. To compare difffer-
ential salience across cities, we asked how the European-born children of 
Turkish immigrants identifĳ ied with, and practiced, their Islamic religion. 
We reasoned that strict forms of religious identity mark salient group 
boundaries between religious in-group members and outsiders. Where 
group boundaries are less salient and more fuzzy, therefore, selective or 
private forms of religious identity should be more common.
Study 1 draws on large-scale surveys among random samples of second-
generation Turks in seven European cities, using the cross-national TIES 
surveys (‘The Integration of the European Second generation’; Crul et al, 
2012). Parallel surveys were conducted in Germany (IMIS 2008), Belgium 
(CeSo-CSCP 2008), the Netherlands (IMES-NIDI 2007-2008) and Sweden 
(CEIFO 2008). Because religion questions were only asked of participants 
who self-identifĳ ied as Muslims, the analyses did not include secular or 
Christian Turkish participants. Most Turkish second-generation partici-
pants in the Belgian and Dutch cities were self-identifĳ ied (mostly Sunni) 
Muslims (over 75 per cent). In the German cities close to 70 per cent, and 
in Stockholm over 40 per cent self-identifĳ ied as Muslim, excluding secular 
Turks and Turkish Christians. This resulted in comparison samples of Turk-
ish Muslims in Berlin (N=156), Frankfurt (N=185), Antwerp (N=330), Brussels 
(N=194), Rotterdam (N=205), Amsterdam (N=166) and Stockholm (N=118). 
It should be acknowledged that the data have a number of limitations, 
including the diffferential selection of Muslims from ethnically defĳ ined 
Turkish samples and the cross-sectional nature of the data (cf. Crul et al, 
2012 for more details on data constraints). Nevertheless, Turkish Muslim 
participants were roughly comparable across cities, with most immigrant 
parents being highly religious and less qualifĳ ied immigrant workers from 
less developed rural regions in Turkey (yet somewhat more secular and 
qualifĳ ied immigrants in Brussels and Amsterdam; see Table 1).
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Table 1  Turkish Muslim minorities in seven cities: Immigrant selectivity, institutional 
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Looking beyond institutional accommodation, we found that cities difffer 
in the degrees of ethnic segregation and inequality (see Table 1). Thus, 
self-reported residential segregation was highest in Berlin and Brussels, 
with over 50 per cent of the participants living in majority-Turkish neigh-
bourhoods. Self-reported segregation was also quite high in Frankfurt (40 
per cent), with moderate segregation in Antwerp and Rotterdam (35 per 
cent), and the lowest levels in Amsterdam and Stockholm (30 per cent). 
Similarly, participants’ educational qualifĳ ications document city difffer-
ences in the degree of persistent disadvantage. These diffferences are all the 
more remarkable against the background of similarly low qualifĳ ications 
of Turkish immigrant parents across the cities (see Table 1). Specifĳ ically, 
Turkish-Muslim participants with higher (tertiary) qualifĳications were most 
absent in Berlin and Frankfurt (3 and 5 per cent resp.) and most present in 
Stockholm (31 per cent); with intermediate rates of higher qualifĳ ications 
in the other cities (ranging from 15 to 20 per cent).
To establish diffferent types of religious identity within each city, K-means 
cluster analysis was conducted separately in each comparison sample, 
using a reliable four-item measure of religious identifĳ ication (e.g. “Being a 
Muslim is an important part of my self”) as well as frequencies of religious 
practices, including ritual practices such as prayer and attending religious 
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gatherings, and dietary practices such as fasting and observing the rules 
of consumption (“halal”). Across all seven comparative contexts, the same 
three clusters could be replicated and were labelled as “private”, “selective” 
and “strict” types of religious identity, with most religious practice among 
strict Muslims, less (mainly dietary) practice among selective, and least 
among private Muslims.
While the same three types of religious identity could be distinguished 
in each city, the distribution of participants over the religious types difffered 
considerably between the cities (see Table 1). In line with our expectations, 
strict forms of religious identity were more prevalent in cities that were less 
accommodating of Islam and where Muslims occupied a lower position in 
the local power hierarchy. At the most exclusionary end (second generation 
in Berlin), strict Muslims were the largest subgroup and private Muslims 
the smallest subgroup of Turkish Muslims. Similarly in Frankfurt, private 
Muslims were least frequent, yet strict and selective types of Muslims 
were roughly equally numerous. Note that signifĳ icant portions of secular 
Turkish participants in German cities (around 30%) suggest polarisation 
between strong religion and secularism. At the multiculturalist end of the 
spectrum, in contrast, more than half of the Turkish Muslim participants 
in Stockholm were counted as private Muslims, while the other half was 
split evenly between selective and strict types of religious identity. Note 
that Stockholm also counts signifĳ icant numbers of Christian Turks (who 
were not included in this analysis). Findings from the Belgian and Dutch 
cities were somewhere in between, with selective Muslims being the most 
prevalent type in Brussels and Amsterdam, and strict Muslims prevailing 
in Antwerp and Rotterdam. Interestingly, these fĳ indings highlight city 
diffferences within the same countries, with higher degrees of inequality 
and more salient religious boundaries in both port cities alike than in the 
capital cities.
To sum up, the patterning of diffferent types of religious identities 
across the seven cities reveals meaningful city diffferences in the salience 
of religious boundaries. Moreover, the overall pattern is in line with dif-
ferent macro-constraints on group boundaries in the diffferent cities. We 
conclude that the national accommodation of Islam interacts with local 
power hierarchies to affford more selective or private types of religious 
identity in some cities (like Stockholm, Amsterdam or Brussels) versus more 
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3.4. Religion and social integration 
Study 2 takes a somewhat diffferent angle on the salience of religious 
group boundaries among the Turkish second generation. In this study, 
Fleischmann and Phalet (2012) operationalised the salience of religious 
boundaries in terms of the social consequences of religious identity. More 
specifĳically, the study examines the coupling of religious identity with social 
integration in other (non-religious) life domains. We used the same cross-
national TIES surveys (cf. supra) to compare second-generation Turkish 
Muslims in the capital cities of the four countries under study. The main 
aim of the study was to test the association (or dissociation) of Islamic 
religiosity and the social integration of Muslims into the wider society. 
Where religious boundaries are more salient, religious identities will have 
more pervasive social consequences in the lives of individuals and in the 
organisation of society (Wimmer, 2008). We reasoned that the enhanced 
‘groupness’ of Muslim minorities in cities with salient religious boundaries 
would impede the societal integration of religious Muslims. As indicators 
of social integration, the study included educational attainment, labour 
market participation, and interethnic marriage. To assess religious identi-
ties, four cross-culturally valid dimensions of religion were distinguished in 
multi-group confĳirmatory factor analysis: religious identifĳ ication, worship, 
dietary practice and public assertion (such as wearing the headscarf). The 
associations of religiosity with the social integration of the Turkish second 
generation was compared across the four capital cities of Berlin, Brussels, 
Amsterdam and Stockholm.
Extending the above argument about the diffferential salience of 
religious boundaries from institutional orders and power hierarchies in 
cities, we expect (most) negative associations between religious identity and 
societal integration in cities like Berlin, with low degrees of accommodation 
(institutional order) and high inequality (power hierarchy). In cities like 
Stockholm, on the other hand, where Islam is formally accommodated and 
where Muslims are less socially disadvantaged, religious boundaries are 
less salient and religious identity should be more compatible with societal 
integration. Accordingly, structural equation models relating religious 
identifĳication, practices and assertion on social integration reveal an inverse 
relation in Berlin. In the German capital, the most religious members of the 
Turkish second generation had the lowest levels of education and were most 
likely to have co-ethnic, rather than interethnic, close ties. Conversely, in 
Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm, second-generation religious identity 
was decoupled from social integration in mainstream society. No signifĳicant 
associations were found between religious identity and any indicator of 
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societal integration. In spite of varying degrees of accommodation between 
Brussels (least), Stockholm and Amsterdam (most), the three cities have in 
common the signifĳ icant (though varying) degree of institutional accom-
modation of Islam, relative to the German capital.
We conclude that the comparative fĳ indings from both studies suggest 
less salient religious boundaries in Brussels, Amsterdam and Stockholm 
than in Berlin. In the former cities, second-generation Turkish Muslims 
more often prefer selective or private types of religious identity, which are 
compatible with social integration into mainstream society. In Berlin, in 
contrast, where religious boundaries are highly salient, the Turkish second 
generation more often adopts strict ways of being Muslim, which stand in 
the way of their societal integration.
4. Religious boundary making within ethnic 
communities
We have seen that the salience of religious boundaries is related to the 
institutional and societal context in which Muslims are embedded. In this 
part of the paper we complement these cross-national comparisons with 
bottom-up perspectives from boundary making processes within Turkish 
and Moroccan communities (the how question). Drawing on Wimmer’s 
framework we propose a bottom-up approach of religious boundary making. 
More precisely, we relate the religious identities of Muslim minorities to 
the micro-processes of cultural maintenance and social closure in diffferent 
ethnic communities. Specifĳically, Study 3 asks whether religious boundaries 
are more stable in community contexts with higher levels of closure and 
maintenance (Maliepaard & Lubbers, 2013). The diffferential stability of 
religious boundaries is operationalised here as the more or less efffective 
transmission of religion to the next generation. Study 4 replicates diffferen-
tial stability across communities and tests whether stability is explained by 
enhanced culture maintenance orientation among highly religious Muslims 
(Güngör, Fleischmann & Phalet, 2011). Finally, Study 5 focuses on the process 
of social closure as it relates to the salience of religious boundaries across 
ethnic communities. We argue that Muslims with more co-ethnic social 
ties will show stronger religious identities, especially in the more close-knit 
Turkish community context (Maliepaard & Phalet, 2012).
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4.1. Comparing ethnic communities 
Some degree of social closure has been associated with sustained religiosity 
in immigrant minorities. For instance, close-knit kinship ties and dense 
ethnic networks are reliably related to immigrant religiosity in the US 
(Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000). Also in European societies, as generally less 
religious receiving contexts than the US, co-ethnic ties predict sustained 
religiosity among immigrants (Van Tubergen & Sindradóttir, 2011). Ethnic 
communities difffer in their degree of social closure. In the European migra-
tion context, Turkish and Moroccan minorities represent major Muslim 
minority populations with a predominantly Sunni Islamic background 
(Voas & Fleischmann, 2012). Both groups have in common their migra-
tion histories as guest workers; and their current living conditions are 
characterised by high overall segregation levels, persistent disadvantage, 
and pervasive discrimination (Heath et al., 2008). At the same time, they 
constitute distinct ethnic community contexts for the second generation, 
with generally higher levels of cultural maintenance and social closure in 
Turkish than in Moroccan communities. For instance, strong family values 
and strict parental control are the rule in Turkish immigrant families (De 
Valk & Liefbroer, 2007). Likewise, Turkish immigrant communities show 
more residential concentration around ethnic business or industrial niches, 
more dense ethnic associations, and higher levels of ethnic language and 
media use as compared to Moroccan communities (Phalet & Heath, 2010). 
Hence, we expect more religious boundary making in most culturally 
rooted and socially bounded Turkish (vs. Moroccan) communities. To test 
this expectation, we will discuss three studies which develop cross-ethnic 
comparative perspectives on religious boundary formation.
Immigrant families instil religion in their children as part of a more 
general orientation towards the heritage culture (Regnerus, Smith & Smith, 
2004). There is much evidence of the purposeful and efffective transmission 
of heritage cultural values and norms in immigrant families. For instance, 
Turkish and Moroccan immigrant parents tend to transmit their conserva-
tive family values and gender role values to the next generation; and value 
transmission has been related to parenting practices that stress restrictive 
control and conformity goals (Kwak, 2003; Phalet & Güngör, 2009). Along 
similar lines, acculturation research shows the continued importance of 
the heritage culture and identity among the European second generation, 
and among Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in particular. Typically, they 
combine a strong orientation towards cultural maintenance with simulta-
neous orientations towards the mainstream culture (Berry, Phinney, Sam 
& Vedder, 2006).
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A separate strand of research in religious studies shows the key role of 
families in the religious socialisation of children (Myers, 1996; King, Furrow 
& Roth, 2002). Little is known, however, about the transmission of religious 
identities to the second generation of Muslims, which underlies stable re-
ligious boundaries in European societies. Focusing on boundary making 
within ethnic communities, the three studies in this section examine the 
family socialisation of religion through parental role modelling (Studies 3 
and 4), as well as community-based religious education (Study 4), and social 
control in co-ethnic peer networks (Study 5).
4.2. Cultural maintenance 
The stability of religious group boundaries is premised on the successful 
transmission of religion across generations. Cultural transmission from one 
generation to the next takes place through goal-directed and explicit so-
cialisation and through more implicit daily routines and social role models 
which instil norm-congruent behaviours (King, Furrow, & Roth, 2002). In 
the religious domain, parental religious practices, such as parents’ mosque 
visits, serve as social models of desired religious behaviours in children and 
imply the habitual involvement of the parents in the religious life of their 
community. In addition, early enrolment in Koran lessons exposes Muslim 
children to formal religious teaching and implies purposeful parental and 
communal investments in children’s religious socialisation. In Study 3 Ma-
liepaard and Lubbers (2013) compared parent-child dyads of self-identifĳ ied 
Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands, using subsamples from 
periodic large-scale minorities surveys by the Netherlands Institute for 
Social Research (SPVA 1998 (Martens, 1999); SPVA 2002 (Groeneveld & 
Weijers-Martens, 2003)). As expected, immigrant parents transmitted Is-
lamic religious practices and attitudes to their children, so that the children 
of more religious parents were themselves more religious later in life, thus 
securing the stability of religious boundaries separating the second genera-
tion from the mainstream society. For instance, regular mosque attendance 
by immigrant parents strongly predicts regular attendance in their children. 
Similarly, Muslim youngsters tended to endorse the religious attitudes of 
their parents, such as the preference for a Muslim marriage partner. Finally, 
when religious transmission was compared across Turkish and Moroccan 
minorities as diffferent community contexts, the parental socialisation 
of religious practice, but not of religious attitudes, was most efffective in 
most culturally bounded Turkish immigrant communities. These fĳ indings 
suggest that high levels of cultural maintenance and social closure at the 
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community level affford the making of religious boundaries through the 
social control of religious behaviour within the ethnic community.
Study 4 follows up on the diffferential stability of religious boundaries 
between ethnic communities; and asks the question how religious so-
cialisation and cultural maintenance interact to produce stable boundaries 
(Güngör, Fleischmann & Phalet, 2011). In a cross-ethnic comparative study 
of self-identifĳ ied Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Belgium, we used retro-
spective data on the religious socialisation of children from the Belgian TIES 
surveys (‘The Integration of the European Second generation’; Swyngedouw 
et al, 2008). Religiosity was reliably assessed in terms of religious identifĳ ica-
tion, worship and dietary practices, and belief or orthodoxy (such as literal 
interpretation of the Qur’an). Combining family- and community-based 
religious transmission, religious socialisation was assessed by retrospec-
tive questions about the frequency of parents’ mosque visits (family-based 
transmission) and the attendance of Qur’an lessons during childhood 
(community-based transmission). The study examines the stability of 
religious boundaries by relating religious socialisation in childhood to the 
adult religious life of second-generation Muslims. First, we replicate and 
extend the cross-ethnic comparison of religious transmission in Study 3, 
by testing how religious transmission difffers between Turkish and Moroc-
can Muslim communities. In addition, we examine whether individual 
diffferences in cultural maintenance orientation mediate religious stability 
across community contexts.
As expected, multi-group structural equation modelling across ethnic 
community contexts revealed stronger religious identities, in terms of their 
religious identifĳ ication, beliefs and practices, for adult Muslims whose 
parents had visited a mosque regularly and who had attended Qur’an 
lessons in their childhood. While both forms of religious transmission 
uniquely predicted religious identifĳ ication and behavioural involvement, 
only religious education predicted orthodox religious beliefs. The latter 
fĳ inding suggests that community-based religious instruction is crucial 
for the stability of religious beliefs as an explicitly cognised component of 
religiosity. Moreover, and in line with the previous study, in the Turkish 
community context with its high level of cultural maintenance and social 
closure, religious transmission is most efffective. Religious boundaries were 
thus most stable among Turkish than among Moroccan Belgian Muslims. 
Last but not least, childhood religious socialisation predicts stable religious 
identities into early adulthood through enhanced cultural maintenance 
orientations among Muslim youth. 
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4.3. Social closure 
In Study 5 Maliepaard and Phalet (2012) used large random samples of 
self-identifĳied Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch Muslims from the 2006 Survey 
Integration Minorities (SIM) by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research 
(Dagevos, Gijsberts, Kappelhof & Vervoort, 2007). In this paper we shifted 
focus from cultural maintenance to social closure as a key boundary making 
process within the ethnic community. And we predicted the salience of 
religious identities, in terms of their consequences for religious practices. 
Replicating contextual diffferences between Turkish and Moroccan com-
munities, we also tested whether religious boundaries are most efffectively 
enforced in most densely networked Turkish communities.
To assess social closure, participants reported the frequency of co-ethnic 
social contacts with Turkish or Moroccan friends and neighbours, as well 
as their cross-ethnic contacts with Dutch friends and neighbours. As a 
measure of salience, religious identifĳication was related to religious practice 
(such as praying and fasting) and public assertion (such as wearing the 
headscarf) as distinct forms of behavioural involvement in the religious 
domain. In accordance with our expectations, multi-group structural 
equation models showed signifĳ icant net efffects of co-ethnic peer networks 
(controlling for cross-ethnic ties). Muslims who were more embedded in 
ethnic networks were also more strongly identifĳied with their religion, more 
ready to endorse public recognition and accommodation, and engaged more 
often in religious practices. Thus, religious boundaries are more salient 
in the lives of Muslims who are embedded in ethnic networks. Moreover, 
ethnic peer networks were most influential in most culturally bounded 
Turkish communities, as evident from the diffferential impact of co-ethnic 
peers on the religious practice of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims. Ethnic 
diffferences were signifĳ icant only for religious practice, however. This latter 
fĳ inding is in line with the previous two studies and suggests that religious 
boundary making operates through the social control of religious behaviour 
in densely networked ethnic communities. 
Conclusion
The starting point of our comparative research on the religious identities 
of European-born Muslims is a combination of two well-documented facts. 
First, there is converging evidence of sustained and strong religion among 
second-generation Muslims in Europe. Second, Muslim minorities face 
real ethnic discrimination and increased public hostility against Islam in 
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European societies. This raises the question how the religious identities 
of Muslim youngsters are jointly shaped by social forces within ethnic 
communities and in the wider society. Taking a heuristic approach from 
religious group boundaries, we addressed the question when and how 
multicultural cities and ethnic communities give rise to strong and stable 
religious identities. We developed comparative arguments and discussed 
comparative fĳ indings with a view to contextualise religious identity and 
to articulate the underlying processes of religious boundary making. 
Drawing on central aspects of Wimmer’s (2008) integrative multi-level 
process account of ethnic boundaries, our studies supplement a comparative 
approach from the macro-level of institutional and structural constraints 
in multicultural cities with a bottom-up approach from micro-processes of 
boundary making within ethnic communities. Taken together, the studies 
develop a twofold comparative approach across multicultural cities and 
across ethnic communities as proximal integration contexts, emphasising 
boundary formation from a minority perspective.
First, cross-national comparisons across the cities in the fĳ irst two studies 
speak to the question when religious boundaries are made salient. The cities 
were selected so as to cover a range of diffferent institutional orders and 
power hierarchies along religious lines. As expected from macro-constraints 
on group boundaries, our fĳ indings provide evidence of more strict forms 
of religious identity in cities where institutional rigidities and social 
disadvantages defĳ ine highly salient boundaries. Strict Muslims combine 
religious identifĳ ication with the full range of dietary and ritual practices, 
whereas the religious identities of selective and private Muslims are partly 
or totally uncoupled from behavioural involvement in the religious domain. 
Comparing across German, Belgian, Dutch and Swedish cities, the religious 
identities of local-born Turkish Muslims reflect the diffferential salience of 
religious boundaries between cities. Thus, more strict forms of religiosity 
prevail in cities like Berlin, where a lack of institutional accommodation 
conspires with relatively high degrees of ethnic segregation and inequality 
to defĳ ine salient group boundaries. In contrast, more private and selec-
tive forms of religious identity come to the fore in cities like Stockholm or 
Amsterdam, which offfer some degree of accommodation and where some 
degree of social mixing and upward mobility amount to the unmaking of 
religious boundaries. Moreover, we fĳ ind more salient religious boundaries 
in the industrial cities of Antwerp and Rotterdam than in the respective 
capital cities, in line with our focus on cities rather than countries as 
comparative cases. Also in line with the diffferential salience of religious 
boundaries between cities, the religious identities of Muslim minorities 
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were detached from social consequences in terms of their societal integra-
tion in cities like Amsterdam, Stockholm or Brussels, which grant some 
degree of institutional accommodation of Islam as a minority religion. The 
exception to the rule was Berlin, where religious involvement was inversely 
related to societal integration, as indicated by the lower education of more 
religious Muslims for instance.
Second, cross-ethnic comparisons in the last three studies address the 
question how boundary making processes give rise to more or less stable 
and salient boundaries. Specifĳ ically, comparisons between Turkish and 
Moroccan community contexts highlight the key role of boundary making 
processes at the micro-level of Muslim families and communities. In support 
of most stable religious boundaries in community contexts where cultural 
maintenance and social closure are generally high, we fĳ ind most efffective 
religious transmission from immigrant parents to their children in Turkish 
(vs. Moroccan) communities in the Netherlands and Belgium. Religious 
identity is passed on to children through family socialisation, as evident 
from the long-term impact of parental role models of religious practice 
in childhood, as well as through community-based religious teaching. In 
support of cultural maintenance as a key boundary making process within 
ethnic communities, religious socialisation is part and parcel of the mainte-
nance of the heritage culture and identity. Across the communities, Muslims 
who were more oriented towards cultural maintenance were also more 
involved in religion later in life. Finally, our last study provides evidence of 
religious boundary making through social closure in co-ethnic networks 
with fellow Muslims. Thus, Muslims with more co-ethnic ties not only 
reported higher levels of religious identifĳ ication but also more behavioural 
involvement in the religious domain. Again, co-ethnic ties best predicted 
religious practice in most densely networked Turkish communities.
To conclude, we should acknowledge some limitations of the present 
studies, as large-scale surveys cannot fully capture the situated meanings 
of religious identities. Moreover, cross-sectional data are ill-suited to reveal 
the dynamic and changing nature of religious identities. In spite of clear 
limitations, however, the studies jointly illustrate the importance of theory-
informed comparative migration research. Strategic comparisons allow us 
to challenge common sense notions of Islam as an inherently strong religion 
which is incompatible with European cultures. Instead, our comparative 
fĳ indings foreground diffferent cities and communities as local integration 
contexts which can make and unmake religious group boundaries. 
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